Criminal law cases to watch in the 2025 Supreme Court term

While this term's Supreme Court docket is not heavily focused on criminal cases, the justices will still decide several significant cases involving key federal criminal statutes and sentencing procedures.

In perhaps the most closely watched criminal case of the term, the Court heard argument in Kousisis v. U.S. (No. 23-909) on Dec. 9, 2024. Kousisis involves the mail and wire fraud statutes underlying many federal financial prosecutions and raises the question of whether they apply to cases where a party uses deception to induce a contract without causing financial loss to the victim. The defendant in the case, a government contractor, was charged with wire fraud for making misleading statements regarding a contract provision, despite no financial harm occurring to the government. The case raises the question of whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if financial harm to the alleged victim is not a primary object of the scheme and even if no tangible economic loss occurs.

In a similar case, the justices will consider this month the scope of a false statement statute in Thompson v. U.S. (No. 23-1095). The case involves a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which prohibits making a "false statement" for the purpose of influencing financial institutions. The justices are asked to decide whether the statute also prohibits making a statement that is misleading but not false. The defendant, Thompson, was convicted for allegedly making misleading statements about the amount of a loan he owed, even though his statements were not outright false. This case will determine whether statements that are merely misleading, but not literally false, fall within the scope of the statute.

These two cases have the potential to expand or narrow the scope of these important, oft-charged criminal statutes. Expanding the scope of fraud and false statement statutes could lead to expanded prosecutions of non-financial deception and vague or subjective statements. But over the past decade, especially with respect to mail and wire fraud statutes, the Court has demonstrated a tendency to narrow the statutes, as in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010), McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), Kelly v. United States, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), and Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306 (2023).

The Court will rule on another question of statutory interpretation, this time in the violent crime context in Delligatti v. U.S. (No. 23-825), which was argued on Nov. 12, 2024. In Delligatti, the Court will consider whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be committed by failing to act, qualifies as a "crime of violence." The petitioner, Delligatti, was convicted of attempting to commit murder under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, with his conviction hinging on the "crime of violence" enhancement for firearm possession. A "crime of violence" involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, but the murder offense at the heart of Delligatti's case can be committed through failure to act. The question of whether inaction can satisfy the "use of force" requirement is one that has split the lower courts.

The Court is also set to rule on two cases involving federal sentencing statutes. In Hewitt v. U.S. (No. 23-1002), to be argued this month, the Court will interpret the reach of the 2018 sentencing reform law known as the First Step Act. Specifically, the Court will decide whether the First Step Act's sentencing reduction provisions apply to defendants who were originally sentenced before the Act was enacted, but whose original sentence is subsequently vacated and who are then resentenced after the Act has been enacted.

And in Esteras v. U.S. (No. 23-7483), to be argued in February, the Court will address the factors a sentencing court may consider when revoking a defendant's term of supervised release following imprisonment. The Court will determine whether district courts have the discretion to consider factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a)(2)(A), which relate to the nature and seriousness of the offense, when deciding whether to revoke supervised release, even though that section is excluded from the list of factors that courts are to consider when revoking supervised release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3583(e). This case could influence how courts balance competing considerations of rehabilitation, punishment, and deterrence in the context of post-conviction sentencing.

The 2025 Supreme Court term thus promises to bring important clarifications to the scope of federal criminal law. These cases will have far-reaching consequences, from the reach of fraud statutes to the retroactive application of sentencing reforms.