By limiting suit to "aggrieved person[s]," did Congress require that an Fair Housing Act plaintiff plead more than just Article III injury-in-fact? Does proximate cause under the FHA require more than just the possibility that a defendant could have foreseen that the remote plaintiff might ultimately lose money through some theoretical chain of contingencies?
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