March 2025

DISBARMENT

Mark Stephen Allen
State Bar #189178, Manhattan Beach (February 5, 2025)

Allen was disbarred by default after he failed to file a response to the notice of disciplinary charges filed against him or to participate in the related proceeding.

The State Bar Court determined that all procedural requirements, including adequate notice, had been satisfied in the matter, and that the motion for entry of Allen's default had been properly served, He did not move to have it set aside or vacated.

He was found culpable of all five counts of professional misconduct charged--most of them relating to a single client matter. His wrongdoing included: failing to act with diligence, failing to respond to reasonable client inquiries, improperly withdrawing from representation, failing to refund unearned fees, and making a material misrepresentation to his client--an act involving moral turpitude. He also failed to update his State Bar records address as required.

At the time Allen was disbarred, there was on additional disciplinary investigation pending against him.

Michael John Avenatti
State Bar #206929, Venice, February 5, 2025

Avenatti was summarily disbarred.

A jury had earlier found him guilty of transmitting interstate communications with the intent to extort (18 U.S.C. §§ 875(d) and 2), attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2), and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346).

The State Bar found the conviction to be final after receiving the criminal docket from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and from the U.S. Supreme Court, which had denied his petition for writ of certiorari.

All three violations are felonies that the court found "necessarily involve moral turpitude."

Steven Jacob Barkin
State Bar #91575, Los Angeles (February 5, 2025)

Barkin was disbarred after he stipulated to committing eight acts of professional misconduct related to three separate client matters.

His wrongdoing included: failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, failing to notify a client of settlement funds received, failing to promptly disburse funds to the client entitled to them, failing to provide an accounting of client funds, and failing to report the judgment entered against him in a civil action to the State Bar. An additional three counts of misappropriating client funds involved moral turpitude.

In one of the underlying matters, Barkin represented a client in a civil matter that resulted in a significant settlement. The client then made numerous investments in real estate and various business ventures with Barkin's office manager, which were funded by checks and cash derived from the settlement. The manager directed the client to make checks payable to Barkin, indicating they would be deposited into his client trust account and used for property downpayments, as well as unspecified joint ventures.

In total, the client gave Barkin $361,000 to fund the purchases and ventures. However, Barkin failed to make certain that the funds were spent as the client intended, but instead, disbursed the money deposited into the trust account for unrelated expenses. The client eventually successfully sued Barkin for attorney malpractice and fraud, and the judge found him liable for the charges. Barkin failed to report the judgment to the State Bar; his appeal of the matter was pending when the present disciplinary decision was issued.

In another case, Barkin deposited $10,000 of client funds into his trust account, negotiating checks made payable to two individuals to whom he owed a legal duty. However, Barkin withdrew the funds from the account for his own personal use.

And in a third case, Barkin was hired to represent a client in a lemon law action. The matter settled for $35,000; the client was entitled to $22,000 of the settlement amount. However, Barkin transferred the client funds received from his client trust account to his general account, effectively misappropriating them. He eventually paid the client the amount due, in a series of four partial payments.

In aggravation, Barkin had been disciplined for professional misconduct two previous times, committed multiple acts of wrongdoing that significantly harmed clients in the instant case, and failed to make restitution to the client who was harmed.

In mitigation he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

Julian Eli Capata
State Bar #50237, Los Angeles (February 5, 2025)

Capata was disbarred by default after he failed to participate in his disciplinary proceeding, despite receiving notice and having the opportunity to do so.

Capata appeared at the initial trial in the matter. After the State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel rested its case, the proceeding was abated pending the filing of a confidential matter. Several months later, the case was unabated, but Capata then failed to appear at a status conference and trial of the case.

He was found culpable of one count of professional misconduct: failing to comply with the conditions attached to an earlier disciplinary reproval. Specifically, he failed to provide proof of completing the State Bar Client Trust School and of passing its final test, failed to provide proof of passing the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Exam, and failed to timely file a final written report.

Capata had one prior record of discipline before being disbarred in the instant case.

Daniel H. Cargnelutti
State Bar #153992, Claremont (February 14, 2025)

Cargnelutti was disbarred after he stipulated to committing 10 acts of professional misconduct related to four distinct client matters.

He was culpable of: two counts of failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, as well as four counts each of failing to maintain the required balance in his client trust account and misappropriating client funds.

The fact patterns in all four client cases were simple and similar: Cargnelutti received sums on behalf of his clients--from the sale of several marital homes in divorce cases and as a share of community property retirement funds. In one matter, he received two checks, but failed to deposit one of them in his client trust account. Though the other funds were properly held in trust, he caused the balance of that account to fall to an impermissibly low level--effectively misappropriating a total of more than $1,144,150.

In aggravation, Cargnelutti committed multiple acts of misconduct that significantly harmed his clients, and failed to make full restitution to them.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation and had practiced law discipline-free for more than 27 years.

Philip Deitch
State Bar #29164, Los Angeles (February 5, 2025)

Deitch was disbarred after he stipulated to committing two counts of professional misconduct--both related to willfully violating terms of earlier disciplinary orders. Specifically, he failed to file a declaration of compliance as directed by the California Supreme Court (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 9.20), and failed to comply with conditions attached to a disciplinary order that was imposed earlier. The terms he violated included: failing to timely schedule and attend an initial meeting with the Office of Probation, failing to review and report reviewing the Rules of Professional Conduct and Business and Professions Code as directed, failing to submit three written quarterly reports to Probation, and failing to complete and report compliance with completing E-learning conditions as required.

In aggravation, Deitch had five prior records of discipline--two involving misconduct committed in approximately the same time period, committed multiple acts of wrongdoing in the present case, and demonstrated indifference to the consequences of his actions.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

Luiz Claudio Fernandes, Jr.
State Bar #322387, Oakland (February 14, 2025)

Fernandes was disbarred by default after he failed to participate in his disciplinary hearing. The State Bar Court was satisfied there was sufficient service and notice of the charges, as verified by the Office of Chief Trial Counsel's evidence of reasonable diligence. It also found the default order had been properly entered, and that Fernandes did not move to have it set aside or vacated.

He was found culpable of all but one of the13 counts charged, which were related to two separate client matters.

His wrongdoing included: failing to perform legal services with competence and failing to represent his client with diligence, as well as two counts each of failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, failing to return unearned advanced fees, failing to render an accounting of client funds, failing to cooperate in the State Bar's investigations of the wrongdoing alleged, and failing to notify the State Bar of his change of address for membership records.

Andrew Jay Kessler
State Bar #236123, Carlsbad (February 5, 2025)

Kessler was disbarred by default.

He did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding in which he was charged with 11 counts of professional misconduct stemming from two client matters.

The State Bar Court determined that all procedural requirements involving service of the charges, actual notice of the proceedings, and entry of the default order had been satisfied in the case. It also verified that Kessler had not responded to the disbarment petition, nor did he move to have the default order entered against him set aside or vacated.

And finally, the court determined that there was an adequate factual basis for disciplinary misconduct. The factual allegations, which were deemed admitted when the default was entered supported culpability for all 11 counts charged. They included: failing to notify the State Bar of his change of address within 30 days; as well as two counts each of failing to respond to clients' reasonable case status inquiries, failing to participate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing alleged, failing to return unearned advanced fees, failing to provide a written accounting for the client funds held, and failing to deposit client funds in a trust account.

Gene Daniel Levoff
State Bar #217907, Los Angeles (February 5, 2025)

Levoff was summarily disbarred after pleading guilty to six felony counts of securities fraud and insider trading (15 U.S.C. § 78J(b), 17 C.F.R.§§ 240.10b-5 & 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. § 2). All counts involve moral turpitude.

Levoff held the position of senior director of corporate law at Apple Inc., where he was responsible for overseeing the company's compliance with securities filing and financial reporting--and later became the corporation's secretary, charged with overseeing compliance with insider trading policy. Over a five-year period, he orchestrated a scheme to defraud the company and its shareholders by "misappropriating material nonpublic information" to execute favorable trades involving the company's securities.

Linda Darlene Lucero
State Bar #283081, Burbank (February 5, 2025)

Lucero was disbarred after an appeal of the hearing judge's findings of culpability on 32 of the 33 counts of professional misconduct related to several distinct client matters; she conceded culpability on four of the counts, but disputed the findings on the remaining 28.

In this appeal, the State Bar Court panel found Lucero culpable of a total of 31 counts of misconduct, and agreed with the hearing judge that disbarment was proper.

Her wrongdoing included: failing to represent a client with diligence, failing to inform a client of significant case developments, failing to promptly notify clients she had received funds belonging to them, failing to provide an accounting of client funds, failing to promptly release a client file when requested to do so, failing to return unearned advanced fees, and failing to cooperate in the State Bar's investigation of the misconduct alleged.

She was also found culpable of two counts of failing to respond to reasonable client inquiries, as well as several counts each of failing to perform legal services with competence, failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, and improperly withdrawing from representation.

Additional counts involved moral turpitude--including three counts of misappropriating client funds and five counts of making material misrepresentations to an expert witness and to State Bar investigators.

In one of the underlying cases involved, Lucero substituted in to represent three siblings in a medical malpractice case against their deceased mother's doctor. In the course of representation, she lied to a hired expert witness about why she needed an expedited opinion, mishandled client funds by depositing a check covering expert witness fees into her operating account and cashing a check for a refund in expert witness fees rather than return it to the clients, and made several misrepresentations to the State Bar about advancing her own funds and paying for expert services related to the case.

In a second case, Lucero met with a woman named as agent in her father's power of attorney who sought to file a malpractice claim against the hospital where he had received treatment. The daughter signed a retainer agreement, a release of medical records, and a filing fee waiver, but there was no discussion of legal costs or expenses. Lucero sent an "intent to sue" letter to the hospital along with a signed release form--though it was not the one the daughter had executed. Lucero claimed to have sent the client numerous letters, which were not received; she could not locate copies. The client eventually became concerned about Lucero's lack of communication. The one-year statute of limitations ran on the malpractice claim. In a letter to the Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC) investigating the case, Lucero made six statements about her contact with the client and documents involved in the case that were deemed to be false and misleading.

In another matter, Lucero received $6,755 from a client for advanced fees. He terminated her representation several weeks later after receiving little information on the case status, and demanded a refund. The two reached a repayment agreement the day the matter was set to be arbitrated, but Lucero failed to make the promised installment payments. The two again reached a repayment agreement after the client filed a small claims action. Again, Lucero did not honor the agreement. The client then filed a complaint with the State Bar. Lucero first told the OCTC she had repaid the client, which was false. She finally refunded the prepaid fees, nearly 2 1/2 years after representation had ended.

Lucero also was retained to represent a client with medical malpractice and personal injury claims. She sent him confirmation letters for both matters, and he had numerous contacts with the Spanish translator in Lucero's office. Lucero also referred the client to a medical care specialist, who in turn referred him to a chiropractor for additional treatment. Lucero was copied on the referral letters. The OCTC sent numerous letters to Lucero regarding her involvement in the case; she denied representing the client.

Two additional cases involved medical malpractice actions against dentists.

In one, the client provided initial medical documentation, and she sent him a "welcome" letter thanking him for the opportunity to represent him. He subsequently made at least 18 telephone calls to Lucero requesting a status update, without receiving a response. Though she testified that she had completed work on the case, including sending an "intent to sue" letter to the dental practice, there was no supporting documentation. She also claimed to have mailed a letter terminating her representation, but again, could not produce a copy--and the client testified he did not receive it.

The other dental malpractice action was ultimately dismissed because no proof of service of the summons and complaint had been filed. Lucero had paid another entity to file the case, but did not try to serve the named defendants or to ascertain the registered agent for service of process, nor did she attend the order to show cause hearing set in the case. The client had paid a $5,000 flat fee and $1,600 in advanced court fees and costs, but Lucero did not deposit the $1,600 into her client trust account.

In aggravation, Lucero committed multiple acts of wrongdoing that significantly harmed several clients, demonstrated indifference toward rectifying or atoning for the consequences of her misconduct, showed a lack of candor in testifying and dealing with clients, and has failed to make restitution owed to clients.

In mitigation, she was allotted moderate weight for stipulating to some easily proven facts in the case.

In affirming the recommendation of disbarment, the panel on appeal underscored the violations involving moral turpitude, beginning its opinion with: "This matter emphasizes the importance of honesty in the practice of law. Where multiple instances of misrepresentation and misappropriation occur along with other misconduct, the most serious discipline is appropriate even in cases where an attorney has no prior misconduct."

Lucero had argued she should receive significant mitigation in light of 10 years of practicing discipline-free. The panel noted, however, that her misconduct began only five years after she had been admitted to practice but she had not been immediately held accountable for it, and noted that "the palliative effect of a few years without discipline being imposed is dramatically minimized when it is compared to the gravity of the misconduct."

Fred Greg Minassian
State Bar #170974, Glendale (February 5, 2025)

Minassian was summarily disbarred.

He had earlier entered a guilty plea to making a false statement to a government agency (18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)). The offense is a felony that involves moral turpitude.

Minassian represented a client who had been stopped by highway patrol officers while in possession of hydrocodone pills. Attempting to stop the related criminal investigation, Minassian sent a false statement on his letterhead, stating that a doctor had prescribed the pills. He also sent a false letter purporting to be from the doctor who had written the prescription.

Felix Paolo Montero
State Bar #262801, Corona (February 5, 2025)

Montero was disbarred by default after he failed to participate, either in person or through counsel, at the disciplinary proceeding in which he was charged with nine counts of professional misconduct, despite receiving actual notice and opportunity. All the misconduct related to a single client matter.

When the Office of Chief Trial Counsel reached Montero by telephone, he confirmed that he had received the notice of disciplinary charges filed against him. However, he did not file a response to them, nor did he seek to have the default eventually entered set aside or vacated.

He was found culpable of all counts charged. They included: failing to perform legal services with competence, failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing his client, failing to inform his client of significant case developments, improperly withdrawing from employment, failing to release client files after being requested to do so, and failing to participate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing alleged. He was also found culpable of three counts of making false and misleading statements to his client--misconduct involving moral turpitude.

Joyce Marie Mullins
State Bar #163605, Rancho Santa Fe (February 5, 2025)

Mullins was disbarred by default. She did not file a response to the notice of disciplinary charges that contained one count of failing to comply with conditions imposed in an earlier disciplinary order.

The State Bar Court determined that the charges had been properly served and filed, that Mullins had adequate notice of the disciplinary proceeding before the default order was entered against her--and that the order was properly entered.

It also found that the factual allegations in the charges supported a finding that Mullins had violated her probation conditions, which warranted the imposition of professional discipline. Specifically, she failed to schedule and participate in the initial required meeting with the Office of Probation, failed to file two written quarterly and criminal probation reports, failed to meet with her probation case coordinator, failed to comply with the conditions of the underling criminal probation, and failed to timely complete the State Bar Ethics School as required.

Mullins had one prior record of discipline before she was disbarred in the instant case.

Mina Lee Ramirez
State Bar #118302, Modesto (February 14, 2025)

Ramirez was disbarred after she stipulated to committing two acts of professional misconduct related to her failure to comply with conditions imposed in an earlier disciplinary order.

Specifically, she failed to notify opposing counsel in pending litigation and file a copy of the notice with the court and also failed to file a declaration that complied with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20(c) despite receiving two letters from the Office of Probation notifying her of the non-compliance.

In aggravation, Ramirez had a prior record of discipline, and committed multiple acts of wrongdoing in the current matter.

In mitigation she entered into a pretrial stipulation.

Irina Carmen Ribeiro
State Bar #280906, San Francisco (February 5, 2025)

Ribeiro was disbarred by default in a consolidated proceeding.

Originally charged with committing 15 counts of professional misconduct related to two client matters, the court dismissed one of the counts. She was then found culpable of the remaining 14. They included: failing to provide an accounting of client funds, failing to promptly release a client's file upon terminating services, failing to maintain complete records of client funds, failing to support relevant laws, commingling personal and client funds in her client trust account, improperly withdrawing from employment, failing to withdraw funds from her client trust account after her interest became fixed, and failing to cooperate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing she was alleged to have committed.

She was also found culpable of two counts each of failing to perform legal services with diligence, failing to respond to reasonable client inquiries, and failing to deposit client funds in a trust account.

Ribeiro appeared for a status conference in the case at which the court set a trial date, but she failed to appear at trial, and a default order was entered against her. She did not act to have it set aside or vacated.

The State Bar Court found all procedural requirements had been satisfied in the case, and that the factual allegations supported a finding of culpability on the 14 remaining counts.

There was one other disciplinary investigation pending against Ribeiro when she was disbarred in the instant case.

Cristopher G. Sabol
State Bar #251317, Los Angeles (February 14, 2025)

Sabol was disbarred by default. Despite receiving adequate notice of his disciplinary proceeding, as evidenced by the Office of Chief Trial Counsel's show of reasonable diligence, Sabol did not file a response to the notice of disciplinary charges against him, nor did he participate in the proceeding, or move to set aside or vacate the default eventually entered against him.

The State Bar Court found that Sabol was culpable of all six counts charged: failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing his client, improperly withdrawing from employment, failing to promptly release the client's file after being requested to do so, as well as two counts of improperly withdrawing from employment. In addition, he failed to cooperate in the State Bar's investigation of the misconduct he was alleged to have committed.

Raoul Jorge Severo
State Bar #78104, Burbank, (February 5, 2025)

Severo was disbarred after he stipulated to committing 11 counts of professional misconduct related to numerous client matters.

He was culpable of charging illegal fees, failing to promptly release a client's file after being requested to do so, failing to refund unearned advanced fees, failing to cooperate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing alleged, and misappropriating client funds--an act involving moral turpitude.

He was also culpable of two counts each of failing to keep clients informed of significant case developments, failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, and failing to promptly render accountings of client funds.

In one of the underlying cases, Severo was hired to represent a client in a defamation case. He accepted $50,000 as a retainer to be held in trust, but deposited it in his operating account, which he then allowed to dip to impermissible levels before he received the required court authorization to bill against the amount held. He also reneged on his written promise to provide the client with periodic billing statements--eventually tendering a bill that failed to track the funds earned and held over time or to state the amount of interest earned.

In another matter, Severo was hired to provide legal services related to anticipated assault charges. A few days later, he contacted the district attorney's office and learned that it had declined the case--assuring that the prosecution would not continue unless new evidence came to light.

In subsequent conversations with his client, he failed to inform her that the case had been declined for prosecution.

In a third case, Severo was retained to provide services related to criminal allegations against a client. Severo's office informed police that he was representing the client and responsible for all related communications. Police detectives contacted Severo several times; he stated he would inform them about how his client intended to proceed after consulting with him. However, he failed to inform the client, who had reached out numerous times over a 10-month period, about any contact with the police. A warrant was issued for the client's arrest, citing the client's lack of cooperation with the police as one basis. Severo failed to promptly return his unearned fees to the client, or to provide the client's new counsel with the case file.

And finally, in a consolidated matter involving seven separate complainants, Severo entered written fee agreements with each of them in which they agreed to pay in advance for legal services he performed; the fees were characterized as "non-refundable." One of the clients agreed that the payment was a flat fee for services; all the others understood the arrangement to be for advanced fees. Severo deposited all fees collected into his operating account rather than a client trust account, as required for all but the flat fee payment.

In aggravation, Severo had three prior records of discipline--including one in which he was previously disbarred, and committing multiple acts of wrongdoing in the present case.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

Robert Irving Slater
State Bar #67572, Encino (February 5, 2025)

Slater was summarily disbarred after the State Bar Court received evidence of the finality of his conviction on 21 felony counts.

His wrongdoing included conspiracy to commit a crime (Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(1)--receiving or providing a referral fee in a workers' compensation case (Cal. Lab. Code § 3215), referring or soliciting business knowing that the individual involved intends to commit welfare fraud (Cal. Penal Code § 549), and 21 counts of assisting another person in concealing or failing to disclose an event that affects the right to an insurance benefit (Cal. Penal Code § 550(b)(3)--misconduct involving moral turpitude per se.

Slater was sentenced to serve two years in jail for a Penal Code § 550(b)(3) violation. The court reduced the additional 20 counts of that violation charged to misdemeanor status, though the State Bar Court noted that "does not alter their status for attorney discipline."

Gretchen Estelle Wettig
State Bar #223310, Berkeley (February 5, 2025)

Wettig was disbarred by default after she failed to participate in the disciplinary proceeding in which she was charged with 10 counts of professional misconduct related to a single client matter.

Her wrongdoing included: failing to perform legal services with diligence, improperly withdrawing from employment, and failing to cooperate in the State Bar investigation of the misconduct alleged; two counts of failing to report judicial sanctions imposed against her; and five counts of failing to obey court orders.

Before ordering disbarment, the State Bar Court determined that the notice of disciplinary charges had been properly served, that reasonable notice was used to provide Wettig with notice of the proceeding, that the default--which she did not challenge--was properly entered against her, and that the factual allegations in the charges supported findings that warranted professional discipline.

William Peyton Wilbar, IV
State Bar #296125, Denver, Colorado (February 5, 2025)

Wilbar was disbarred by default in a conviction referral matter involving possessing drug paraphernalia (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11364(a)), possessing a controlled substance (Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)), and unlawfully causing a fire to property (Cal. Penal Code § 452(d)). All the offenses are misdemeanors.

When the conviction became final, the State Bar's Review Department referred it to the Hearing Department for a determination of whether the facts and circumstances involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.

Wilbar did not file a response to the notice of hearing in the matter, and a default was entered against him, which he did not move to have set aside or vacated. The State Bar Court determined that all procedural requirements had been satisfied.
In the underlying matter, witnesses reported seeing a man set fire to two political campaign signs with a lighter. A week later, police located a man wearing apparel matching the witness description and arrested him. During questioning, the man identified himself as Wilbar, who confirmed he was the person in the arson investigation photo and confessed to setting fire to the signs.

Arresting officers also found a methamphetamine pipe and a small plastic bag of methamphetamine in Wilbar's possession.

There were other disciplinary matters pending against Wilbar when he was disbarred in the current case.

SUSPENSION

Richard Lawrence Antognini
State Bar #75711, Chico (February 5, 2025)

Antognini was suspended from practicing law for 30 days and placed on probation for one year after he stipulated to committing three acts of professional misconduct related to a single client matter.

He was culpable of failing to perform legal services with diligence, failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, and failing to promptly refund unearned advanced fees.

Antognini was hired to prepare an appeal of an order to set aside default judgments. The fee agreement in the case specified an advanced fee of $10,000--which Antognini received in two installments, and he deposited them into his operating account. He used a process serving company to serve both the notice of appeal and a substitution of attorney. The notice of appeal was rejected, based on a local rule then in effect related to court procedures during COVID-19. Antognini did not act to rectify the rejection, nor did he prepare or file an appeal on his clients' behalf.

The court subsequently filed a writ of execution of the money judgment at issue, which was accompanied by a notice of levy seeking satisfaction of the judgment by levying one of the client's private residences.

The clients eventually hired new counsel who was unsuccessful in getting the default entered set aside. The client then filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

In aggravation, Antognini had a prior record of discipline and committed multiple acts of wrongdoing in the present case that significantly harmed his clients.

In mitigation, he entered into a prefiling stipulation and provided letters from nine individuals taken from the legal and general communities--all of whom vouched for his good character.

Louis Jay Esbin
State Bar #119705, Valencia (February 5, 2025)

Esbin was suspended for 60 days and placed on probation for one year after a four-day trial of the disciplinary charges against him related to misconduct in a single client matter.

He was found culpable of failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, failing to render an accounting of client funds received, failing to promptly refund unearned advanced fees, failing to promptly release the client file upon termination, and intentionally misappropriating client funds--misconduct involving moral turpitude.

In the client matter at issue, Esbin was hired to provide services related to possible bankruptcies of two entitites.

The retainer agreement provided for an advanced fee of $7,500 and advanced costs of $700, which the client paid by check that Esbin deposited into his operating account. Shortly after that, the client contacted Esbin, seeking his advice as to "either winding up or filing bankruptcy." Esbin did not reply.

The corporate directors subsequently authorized the corporation's dissolution, and asked for a refund of the unearned costs and fees paid in anticipation of the bankruptcy filing. The subsequent dispute over the refund of legal fees went to arbitration, with the arbitrator deciding the client was entitled to a full refund of the funds paid and awarding an additional amount to be paid for the cost of the arbitration fees and any accruing interest.

Just over four months later, Esbin paid the fee and interest amount.

In aggravation, Esbin committed multiple acts of wrongdoing--including one count of uncharged misconduct related to depositing funds for advanced costs into his operating account.

In mitigation, he had practiced law for more than 30 years without a record of discipline, submitted evidence from 12 individuals who attested to his good character and pro bono service, and was allotted limited mitigating weight for stipulating to easily proven facts.

Jeffrey L. Harris
State Bar #281778, Los Angeles (February 5, 2025)

Harris was suspended from the practice of law for 90 days and placed on probation for two years after he successfully completed the State Bar Court's Alternative Discipline Program (ADP).

He had earlier stipulated to committing numerous acts of professional misconduct related to six client matters, including: failing to reasonably consult with his client about objectives in an action, communicating directly with a represented party, breaching his fiduciary duty to a client, representing a client after a conflict of interest arose and without obtaining the client's prior written consent, and failing to comply with probation condiitons; three counts of making false and misleading statements to the State Bar, opposing counsel, and the Office of Probation--wrongdoing involving moral turpitude; and seven counts each of violating unauthorized practice laws and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.

In aggravation, Harris had a prior record of discipline and committed multiple acts of misconduct in the instant case.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, and received additional mitigating credit for successfully completing the ADP.

Gregory Lyle Jackson
State Bar #212265, Bakersfield (February 5, 2025)

Jackson was suspended from practicing law for six months and placed on probation for two years.

He stipulated to pleading no contest to two charges related to two separate incidents of driving under the influence.

In one incident, a neighbor summoned police after hearing a loud noise and observing Jackson sitting in the car in his own driveway; he had driven into a post supporting an awning on the property. A breathalyzer test administered at the scene indicated a blood alcohol concentration of .194 percent. Jackson pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge of "wet reckless" (Cal. Veh. Code § 23103.5), and the other charges against him were dismissed.

In the second incident, Jackson collided with another car while driving; the force of the crash caused his car to spin out, cross a median and then strike a tree. The driver of the other car threatened Jackson when he approached and attempted to speak with him. Jackson then got back in his car, reversed over the median and hit a water pipe before driving away. His blood alcohol concentration, determined in a blood test, was .172 percent.

The State Bar Court determined that neither violation involved moral turpitude, but did involve other misconduct warranting professional discipline.

In aggravation, Jackson had two prior records of discipline.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, suffered from extreme emotional and physical difficulties during the time of the misconduct due to a viral neurological condition, and was allotted nominal mitigating credit for evidence of his good character and pro bono service, which was provided in letters by two members of the legal community.

Jonathan Bruce Klinck
State Bar #119926, Rolling Hills Estates (February 5, 2025)

Klinck was suspended for nine months and placed on probation for two years after the State Bar Court received evidence that his criminal conviction had become final.

Klinck had entered a plea of no contest to inflicting injury on a spouse resulting in a traumatic condition (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a)), a felony. As part of a plea deal, the prosecution agreed to postpone sentencing for two years--during which time Klinck was required to attend 52 domestic violence classes and to comply with a protective order; if he complied, the felony charge would then be reduced to a misdemeanor. An additional charge of willful and unlawful use of force and violence resulting in infliction of serious bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 243(d)) was dropped in the plea agreement.

Relevant underlying facts: Klinck's wife, who had an alcohol and substance abuse problem, agreed to enter the Betty Ford Clinic for treatment. However, on the day she was to be admitted, she refused to go. Klinck and his wife then argued, and he picked up a five-pound dumbbell and struck her on the head with it, causing a serious head wound and shaking symptoms that appeared to be a seizure. When police officers responding to the scene asked whether there were any firearms in the residence or whether he owned any, Klinck responded in the negative. In fact, there were at least two firearms in the house at the time.

After the incident, Klinck's wife had additional problems; she was arrested for grand theft and failed to appear at her arraignment. As part of a plea deal, she again agreed to participate in care at the Betty Ford Clinic, but was released after six weeks due to memory problems that hampered her participation. She was then moved to a memory care facility.

The present opinion focused on whether the conviction at hand involved moral turpitude. Klinck argued it did not, and cited several cases--all of which the court distinguished. It concluded instead: "In sum, Respondent's violent attack on his wife precipitated by a verbal, non-physical encounter, constituted a breach of his duties owed to his spouse and, taken together with his dishonest statements to the responding officer, the court finds that Respondent displayed disrespect for the law, societal norms, and for the safety of others, thereby meeting the definition of moral turpitude."

In mitigation, Klinck had practiced law approximately 35 years without a record of discipline. He was also allotted moderate mitigating weight for evidence from five character witnesses--two of whom were family members, and limited weight for his partial stipulation of easily provable facts and for demonstrating some remorse for his misconduct as expressed to a friend and some family members.

Marc Alan Legget
State Bar #132997, Beverly Hills (February 5, 2025)

Legget was suspended from the practice of law for one year and placed on probation for two years after he stipulated to failing to comply with several conditions imposed in an earlier disciplinary order.

Specifically, he failed to timely submit the stipulation, waiver, participation plan, and acknowledgment letter related to his participation in the Lawyer's Assistance Program (LAP); failed to submit a declaration attesting to having read the Rules of Professional Conduct and specified portions of the Business and Professions Code; failed to submit three quarterly reports and one final written report to the Office of Probation; failed to submit three LAP reports written by himself and three from LAP staff to the Office of Probation; failed to submit three copies of written instructions to LAP; failed to comply with his participation plan by missing an LAP group session; and failed to submit proof of completing the State Bar's Client Trust Account School and Ethics School.

In aggravation, Legget had a prior record of discipline, and committed multiple acts of wrongdoing by violating numerous probation conditions.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

William Blackford Look, Jr.
State Bar #66631, Monterey (February 5, 2025)

Look was suspended from practice for 18 months and placed on probation for three years after he stipulated to committing four acts of professional misconduct related to a single client case.

He was culpable of failing to withdraw from employment as requested, as well as three counts of revealing confidential client information.

In the client case at hand, Look was hired to intercede in a civil matter that a law school grad had filed against his law school. Look's services were to draft and file motions preliminary to filing an appeal of a court's earlier order, attempting to renegotiate a settlement of the matter, and appealing the order if negotiations failed.

After the court denied Look's motion to file an amended complaint and amended answer to the cross-complaint in the case, the client sent numerous messages to Look seeking permission to have direct communication between opposing counsel and the client. Look refused, and the client terminated his representation. Look then refused to execute a substitution of attorney form. In a message sent to the client and opposing counsel and in a pleading filed with the court, Look included confidential information about the client's alleged inability to pay his legal bill and incompetence in handling his legal matter.

In aggravation, Look had three prior records of discipline and committed multiple acts of wrongdoing in the instant matter.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation.

Daniel Victor Martinez
State Bar #123676, Yuba City (February 5, 2025)

Martinez was suspended for two years and placed on probation for three years after he stipulated to entering a guilty plea to selling unregistered securities (15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)(1) and (c), and 77(x)).

In the underlying matter, Martinez worked with the chair of the board of directors of a microcap biotechnology company to sell shares of the company. The shares were distributed through a limited liability company (LLC) of which Martinez was the sole manager; the LLC's sole asset was the shares in the biotech company, which it received for no consideration.

Martinez opened a brokerage account to deposit the company's shares, but did not disclose that the chair owned the shares and intended to benefit from their sale. He also obtained a legal opinion for a broker that the shares were eligible for deposit and did not need to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In truth, the shares were not eligible for unrestricted sale with registration. However, based on the information Martinez provided, the broker proceeded with the deposit. Martinez then began selling the shares on the open market, generating $1.3 million in proceeds.

The proceeds were wired to the LLC's bank account; the company chair then directed Martinez to distribute the proceeds to third parties--including himself.

The State Bar Court determined that the violation at issue involved moral turpitude.

In mitigation, Martinez entered into a pretrial stipulation, had practiced law discipline-free for approximately 30 years, provided good character reference letters by seven individuals from the legal and general communities, and submitted evidence of pro bono and community volunteer work. The court also allotted mitigating weight based on the fact that the misconduct occurred remotely in time, noting: "Respondent's successful compliance with his criminal probation coupled with the lack of misconduct for eight years is significant such that an inference of rehabilitation can be reasonably drawn and reflects that he has not been a danger to the public for an extended period of time."

Dale G. Nowicki
State Bar #266652, La Mirada (February 5, 2025)

Nowicki was suspended from the practice of law for 90 days and placed on probation for two years. He stipulated to committing two acts of professional misconduct: making material misstatements to his employer--wrongdoing involving moral turpitude.

Nowicki, while working as a sole proprietor of his law office, represented the plaintiff in a wrongful death case, eventually affiliating with co-counsel at a firm known for representing similarly situated clients. While the case was pending, Nowicki applied for a position with the State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC), and began working in that role a couple months later. He continued on in his law firm, as well as acting as co-counsel in the wrongful death case.

OCTC maintains a policy prohibiting outside employment without prior approval. On his first day at OCTC, Nowicki signed an "Outside Employment and Volunteering Disclosure," misstating he had no outside employment or volunteer work.

In addition, Nowicki, as a public employee, was required to complete an annual "Statement of Economic Interests," or Form 700. When doing so, he neither reported ownership of his firm, nor did he list the fair market value of the business as required.

Nowicki resigned from the OCTC shortly after a reporter filed a public records request about his possible outside legal work.

In mitigation, Nowicki entered into a prefiling stipulation, and had practiced law for 11 years without a record of discipline.

Anthony Patrick Radogna
State Bar #261859, San Bernardino (February 5, 2025)

Radogna was suspended from practicing law for 30 days and placed on probation for one year after he stipulated to committing 11 acts of professional misconduct related to two client matters.

His wrongdoing included: improperly withdrawing from representation, failing to maintain proper records of client funds, failing to communicate sufficiently to allow the client to make informed decisions, failing to deposit client funds in a trust account, and failing to cooperate in the State Bar's investigation of the wrongdoing alleged. He was also culpable of two counts each of: failing to provide appropriate accountings of client funds, failing to promptly return unearned advanced fees, and failing to promptly release clients' papers and property upon termination of employment.

Radogna represented one client in two distinct matters--both germane to the present proceeding. In the first, he was hired to peruse attorneys' billing records to ascertain whether to dispute their fees; he accepted $2,500 in advance, which he deposited into his personal checking account.

The second matter was an appeal of a superior court judgment; for that, he accepted a $20,000 retainer as specified in a written fee agreement, which he deposited in his client trust account.
While the agreement specified that Radogna would provide periodic invoices for the work he performed, he failed to do so. It also provided that Radogna could pay a specified law firm for research and document review work with the client's prior approval. Radogna hired and paid the group, but failed to seek the client's prior approval.

After the firm determined that the appeal had little chance of succeeding, Radogna requested that it be dismissed. And he performed little substantive work on the other matter before terminating his representation. The client requested a status update, accounting of fees, description of work performed, and refund of unearned fees, but Radogna did not respond. Nor did he respond to State Bar investigators' repeated requests for information, though he made six requests to extend the time to respond.

In the second client matter, Radogna was hired to represent another lawyer in a State Bar disciplinary investigation. Though he communicated with the client initially, Radogna failed to file a response as promised, then stopped responding to the client, who hired new counsel.

In aggravation, Radogna committed multiple acts of misconduct.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, provided letters from nine individuals taken from the legal and general communities--all of whom attested to his good character, and submitted evidence of performing community service and pro bono work. He was also allotted some mitigating weight for having practiced law discipline-free for seven years--that credit moderated by the short time.

Fahed Sayegh
State Bar #230297, Altadena (February 14, 2025)

Sayegh was suspended for three years and placed on probation for four years after he stipulated to committing 16 acts of professional misconduct related to several different client matters.

His wrongdoing included: practicing law when not legally entitled to do so, failing to deposit client funds into a trust account, failing to comply with a client's requests for information, seeking to mislead a judicial officer, failing to inform a client of significant case developments, and failing to comply with conditions attached to an earlier disciplinary order, as well as three counts of failing to perform legal services with competence. An additional seven counts involved moral turpitude: making material misrepresentations to a client, to State Bar investigators, and on legal documents.

In one of the matters, Sayegh was retained to represent a client who had been injured in a slip and fall. However, he took no action on the case for nearly two years--and then filed a complaint form only after the statute of limitations had run in the matter. In the meantime, the client made numerous inquiries about the status of her case--and was falsely assured by Sayegh or his staff that the case was proceeding and that medical bills, reports, and a settlement demand had been properly submitted. Because the limitations period had expired, the defendant refused to offer a settlement--and Sayegh submitted an amended complaint falsely stating that delays in the case were caused by the defendant's representatives, and also attached a fraudulently altered letter purporting to extend the statute of limitations in the matter. The court ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice. Sayegh later undertook to settle costs and remove a lien related to the matter while he was suspended from practice in the terms of an earlier disciplinary order.

In another case, Sayegh was hired by a client who had been arrested for driving under the influence, promising to request that the DMV stay the suspension of her license and to represent her in an administrative hearing. However, Sayegh failed to take any meaningful actions, and then misrepresented that he had actually attended three court hearings on her behalf. When State Bar personnel attempted to investigate the matter, Sayegh made numerous false claims about his handling of the case and tendered a fabricated letter purportedly from a dentist's office verifying his "emergency visit" there.

In aggravation, Sayegh had a prior record of discipline, committed multiple acts of misconduct in the instant case--some of which harmed his client and the administration of justice, and demonstrated a lack of candor with State Bar personnel attempting to investigate the misconduct alleged.

In mitigation, he entered into a pretrial stipulation, provided character references from seven individuals taken from the legal and general communities, and was suffering from physical difficulties during the time of the misconduct.

Christopher Salvatore Scarcella
State Bar #280213, Claremont (February 5, 2025)

Scarcella was suspended from the practice of law for 30 days and placed on probation for one year.

The notice of disciplinary charges with which he was served alleged 11 counts of professional misconduct related to two client matters. Scarcella sought, and was granted admission into the Alternative Discipline Program (ADP).

After Scarcella successfully completed his participation in the ADP, the program judge determined that he was entitled to receive the lower level of discipline set forth in the Confidential Statement related to the case, which included 30 days of actual suspension. That judge also credited time in an earlier unrelated administrative suspension. That period of credit was not included in the Confidential Statement.

The State Bar's Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC) appeals in this summary review proceeding, arguing that the judge erred in affording the credit toward Scarcella's period of actual suspension.

The decision in the present case noted that the program judge is afforded broad discretion, and may consider a wide range of dispositions. However, it holds that the judge erred in this case. It noted that the OCTC underscored that the alteration "not only violates rule 5.384(A), which mandates that the program judge provide a written statement of the discipline to be imposed upon successful or unsuccessful completion of the ADP, but also prejudiced OCTC be precluding it from seeking interlocutory review of the decision."

PROBATION

Jennifer Lynn Knops
State Bar #271212, Petaluma (February 14, 2025)

Knops was placed on probation for one year after successfully completing the State Bar Court's Alternative Discipline Program (ADP).

After submitting a statement along with a letter from her mental health provider establishing a nexus between her mental health issues and the charges in the instant case, she was admitted into the ADP.

She also entered into a stipulation setting forth the factual findings, legal conclusions, and mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the matter. It enumerated five acts of moral turpitude related to a single incident.

In that matter, while driving, Knops collided with a center divide on a highway; no other people or vehicles were involved. Shortly after the incident, Knops used a phone app to purchase collision insurance and submitted a claim. In written and oral responses to insurance investigators, she claimed she had purchased the insurance prior to the collision.

She subsequently pled no contest to one count of presenting a false insurance claim containing misleading information (Cal. Penal Code § 550(b)(1)).

In aggravation, Knops committed multiple acts of wrongdoing.

In mitigation, she entered into a pretrial stipulation, had practiced law nearly five years without a record of discipline, suffered from mental difficulties due to a violent crime that occurred shortly before the collision, and made efforts at rehabilitation by receiving treatment for those difficulties. She was also allotted mitigating credit for letters from 12 individuals from the legal and general communities who vouched for her good character, for performing some community service, and for incurring no additional convictions or discipline charges in the five years since entering her plea.

--Barbara Kate Repa