Jan. 30, 2026
Sometimes you can get what you need: In re Marriage of Strong
When spousal support is owed but assets are intangible, like copyrights, courts may face unusual enforcement questions--as shown in a case testing the limits of family law and intellectual property.
Scott M. Gordon
Neutral
Signature Resolution LLC
Email: judgegordon@signatureresolution.com
Southwestern University School of Law
Judge Gordon (Ret.) is a member of the International Network of Hague Judges.
In their 1969 album, "Let it Bleed," the Rolling Stones
introduced the classic song "You Can't Always Get What You Want." This
past October, a Los Angeles divorcee, faced with the challenge of getting what
she wanted under her dissolution judgment, ended up getting exactly what she
needed from an appellate court.
In
re Marriage of Strong (2nd District Court of Appeal, Case No.
B345843, Oct. 29, 2025) asks how far a court can go in reaching assets to
satisfy spousal and child support arrearages. The question posed was: is the court limited to cash assets and real property,
or can intellectual property assets be reached to satisfy the debt.
Strong particulars, strong arguments
Brett and Monique Strong were married
for about seven years, separating in 2016. They began their dissolution case,
during which certain orders, including child and support orders, were issued by
the court.
In 2024, Brett requested to have his spousal support
obligations terminated. Finding that Monique had made little effort to become
self-sufficient and that Brett, then 70 years old, had no income or savings and
"had not been productive for many years," the court granted Brett's request. It
ordered spousal support terminated retroactively to August 2012.
In most other cases, this would have
been the end of the story. In the Strong case, however, substantial
amounts of support had not been paid by Brett to Monique. Monique claimed that
she was owed approximately $2 million in unpaid support and interest, an amount
that was not subject to dispute.
The key question for the parties and the court was where
the money to pay the arrearage would come from. Brett was a renowned sculptor.
He didn't have income or savings, but he held the copyright on works from
Michael Jackson, namely, "The collected Works of the Jackson-Strong Alliance."
Monique asked the court to assign the copyright in these
works to a receiver so that she could get the funds needed to satisfy the
outstanding debt. Brett argued that the court did not have authority to assign
the copyright.
Drafting a receiver for the team
At Monique's request, the lower court
appointed a receiver and ordered Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver
so the receiver could monetize the copyright and pay the judgment. Brett,
however, appealed. Pointing to Code of Civil Procedure Section 708.510, he
argued that the court had no authority to recruit a receiver for this purpose.
The code states that, upon application from a judgment
creditor such as Monique, a court can order a judgment debtor to assign to the
creditor, or to an appointed receiver, all or part of the right to payment due
or to become due. Types of payments subject to assignment are wages, rents,
commissions, royalties, payments due from a patent or copyright, and insurance
policy loan value.
The express language of the statute,
Brett contended, would not support the assignment of his copyright in the
Michael Jackson work to a receiver. While not disputing his debt or the fact
that his copyright was his only asset, Brett argued that the law did not
authorize a court to compel assignment of a copyright; such authority existed
only for patents.
Receivers have a long history in
family cases
Receivers have been part of the
California family law playbook for more than a century. Back in 1906, in McAneny v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara
Cnty (1906) 150 Cal. 6, the California
Supreme Court approved the use of a receiver to take charge of property for the
payment of support and attorney fees.
Family Code Section 290,
enacted in 1992, amended in 2006, and further amended effective 2023, states
that "a judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be enforced
by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by
any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to
be necessary."
Receivers are free agents, but they
come with costs
The receiver is neither an advocate
nor an agent of the parties. He or she is a neutral third party who serves as
an agent of the court and has a fiduciary duty to both parties in the case.
An appointed receiver will take
control of specified assets, and if applicable, will collect income and profits
from those assets. He or she will distribute the assets as required by the law
and court orders and will pay any necessary costs and taxes owed out of those
assets. The receiver can also be appointed to sell or liquidate the assets at
issue.
The receiver can be an important tool in family law cases,
especially in cases involving the management of a community business, the sale
or wind-down of a business and/or the enforcement of a judgment. That being said, careful consideration should be given to
the impact a receiver might have on a case. Although the receiver can provide
an effective and efficient solution to a complicated case, there will be costs
and other impacts.
A receiver is understandably expensive. The tasks assigned
to the receiver are often complex, involving the operation and even the
restructuring of a business, the liquidation of assets and the distribution of
profits and proceeds. The receiver may also be charged with making decisions
that can and will have a long-term impact on assets, especially those of
businesses.
The legal playing field is expansive
CCP Section 708.620
provides that the court may appoint a receiver to enforce a judgment when the
judgment creditor shows that, considering the interests of both the judgment
creditor and debtor, the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to
obtain the fair and orderly satisfaction of the judgment. CCP Section 564 (b)(3)
states that such a receiver may be appointed by the court in which the action
or proceeding is pending, after judgment, to effectuate the judgment.
In Strong, Brett argued that
the language of CCP Section 708.510 did not support the assignment of
copyrights to a receiver. The statute, he asserted, only authorizes appointment
of a receiver to deal with "payments due from a patent or copyright."
Not so, according to the appeals court. The fact that the
legislature identified one source of payment for the collection of debt did not
exclude other sources of payment. The statute, it noted, says "including but
not limited to"--a clear indication that the list of sources is not exclusive.
The court found that "although no
published California decision has yet held that a court may order the forced
assignment of a copyright in particular, cases dating back to the 19th century
uphold the forced assignment of other forms of a debtor's intellectual property
to satisfy a creditor's judgment."
The court found support for its
position in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions, citing In re
Constant (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1993, Nos. 92-55465, 92-56220, 92-56475), which
applied California law in affirming a district court's order directing a debtor
to assign his copyrights and patents to the United States Marshal to satisfy an
outstanding judgment; and Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. Clinton ((2014)
766 F.3d 991, 933), which applied a Washington statute analogous to CCP Section
695.010 in affirming a district court order assigning debtor's copyrights to
receiver to satisfy creditor's money judgment.
The court observed that use of receivers in issues dealing
with support arrearages is nothing new in California family law. In a 1951 case
involving apportionment of receiver's fees in a dispute over a business and
payment of support, the court said, "[t]he rule is well established that the
compensation to be allowed receivers and their attorneys is primarily within
the sound discretion of the trial court." (Venza v.
Venza, (1951) 101 Cal. App. 2d 678, 680.)
Conclusion
In the end, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court's order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to
the receiver. The case reminds us that, when addressing matters relating to the
enforcement of a judgment or order for support, all available tools, including
a receiver, must be considered. The Strong case shows that, as the
Rolling Stones counseled us:
You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometime
you just might find
You get what you need.
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