Administrative/Regulatory
Nov. 16, 2026
The long, strange history of writs of mandamus
From medieval England to modern California, writs of mandamus have served as a powerful legal tool to compel government officials to follow the law and protect individual rights, including access to education and marriage equality.
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
Joseph M. Lipner
Judge
Los Angeles County Superior Court
Civil
Harvard Law School, 1988
The Los Angeles Superior Court has three Writs and Receivers courtrooms. Mention these courts to a non-lawyer and confusion follows. What do these courts do? What kinds of cases do they hear? Do you spell the first word: "writs" or "ritz"? But to some lawyers and judicial officers--including me--the name carries a wonky, old-fashioned appeal. The writs at issue have an extraordinarily long and colorful history. A colourful history, I should say: the story starts in England hundreds of years ago.
Judges in the Writs and Receivers departments hear petitions for writs of mandamus, a procedure dating back to medieval times. In Latin, mandamus means "We command." The writ of mandamus started its legal life as a command from the king of England to carry out his orders. From there, the mandamus proceeding developed into a type of lawsuit in which private parties (often nominally in the name of the king) asked the courts to command government officials and sometimes others to fulfill their legal obligations. Given its close connection to the king's power, in the early years in Britain parties often brought such writs in the Court of King's Bench.
For more than 400 years, litigants have used writs of mandamus to challenge decisions against them. The writ became a powerful tool that allowed people treated unlawfully to compel government officials to follow the law.
Successful litigants could include the unpopular and unlikable. Consider, for example, the 1615 decision in James Bagg's Case. Bagg was a burgess or magistrate in the City of Plymouth, a position similar to a city council member today. James Bagg was an obnoxious man who kept trash-talking his fellow officials. To one, he said, "You are some prince, are you not?" and called him a "cozening knave"--a thieving rascal--though the fellow was well-known for his honesty. Bagg called another mild-mannered mayor "insolent" and turned "the hinder part of his body in an inhuman and uncivil manner" towards him, saying "contemptuously and uncivilly," in a loud voice, "Come and kiss."
To no one's surprise, they stripped James Bagg of his office. But Bagg asked the Court of King's Bench to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the City of Plymouth to restore him to power. And the court sided with Bagg. Removal from office, reasoned the court, should follow only for acts against the public good or against the official's oath, and only after a hearing. Words of private contempt or against good morals might be grounds for punishment but were not grounds for removal. Moreover, Bagg did not receive a hearing before he was removed from office. As the court pithily stated, "A removal, without hearing the party removed, is bad." (James Bagg's Case (1615) 77 E.R. 1271.)
Other colorful mandamus controversies march through the pages of early British law reports. In 1722, Richard Bentley, a famously combative classical scholar, obtained a writ of mandamus requiring Cambridge University to restore his academic degrees, which the university had taken from him when he refused to appear in a civil lawsuit and criticized the court's power. (Rex v. University of Cambridge (1722) 93 E.R. 698.) In 1733, a Coventry bishop refused to license a duly elected grammar schoolteacher based on reports that the teacher was "a person of a very profligate and scandalous life, and very unfit for the education of children." The court adjourned without ruling on the writ of mandamus to give the bishop time to investigate the teacher's character. (Rex v. Bishop of Litchfield (1733) 87 E.R. 1200.) In 1766, the City of Cambridge elected a mayor who was an officer in the British army and went off to serve military duty in North America, "without the least probability of returning till long after" his term would expire. Because of his inability to serve, the court ruled his election was in fact "no election at all" and issued a writ of mandamus requiring Cambridge to hold a new election. (Rex v. Mayor, Bailiffs and Burgesses of Cambridge (1767) 98 E.R. 46.)
American courts adopted the writ of mandamus from their British forebears. Fun fact: the famous case of Marbury v. Madison--which established that courts have the power to invalidate unconstitutional acts of Congress--was a mandamus case. The petitioner, Marbury, had been granted a commission by President Adams to serve as justice of the peace in Washington, D.C. The commission was final in every way except that it had not been delivered to Marbury before Adams left office. President Jefferson, from a different political party than Adams and Marbury, instructed his secretary of state not to deliver the commission. Marbury sought a writ of mandamus requiring delivery of his commission. The Supreme Court held that Marbury would have been entitled to his commission and that mandamus would ordinarily have been an appropriate remedy. But the Supreme Court held that Article III of the Constitution did not give it original jurisdiction to issue the writ; the Constitution limited the court's original jurisdiction only to cases where states or ambassadors were parties. The Judiciary Act of 1789, which purported to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in the case before it, conflicted with Article III and was therefore unconstitutional.
California inherited this centuries-old legal remedy almost from the moment it became a state. And California litigants immediately discovered that mandamus could be useful in controversies every bit as colorful as those that had once occupied the English courts. Reported California mandamus cases go back to 1850, the year of the first volume of the California Reports. A judge in Yuba County had expelled three attorneys from the local bar because they had "set at defiance the authority of this Court," and had "vilified and denounced its proceedings." The California Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the judge to rescind the order. The remedy for such conduct was a contempt proceeding, and the lawyers received no notice of their possible disbarment and no right to defense. (People ex rel. Mulford v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 143; People ex rel. Field v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 190.) One of the reinstated lawyers, Stephen J. Field, later became a justice of the California Supreme Court in 1857 and a justice of the United States Supreme Court in 1863.
Liquor and stimulants show up frequently in California mandamus actions from the last century. In 1934, Stanford University successfully used mandamus to revoke the license of a pharmacy that was too close to its campus because the pharmacy sold intoxicating liquor. (Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. State Bd. of Equalization (1934) 1 Cal.2d 784.) In 1946, the state suspended the racing license of a horse trainer whose racehorse--with the unfortunate name "Cover Up"--tested positive for caffeine after a race at Del Mar Racetrack. The trial court had granted the trainer mandamus canceling the suspension because there was no proof the trainer had administered the caffeine. But the California Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the anti-doping rules were valid strict liability regulations that required no such proof. (Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 401.) In 1960, a bar owner whose liquor license had been revoked in an anti-solicitation sting operation sought mandamus to have the license reinstated. A government agent, posing as a customer, agreed to buy high-priced drinks for one of the bar's dancers in exchange for her company. The drinks looked fancy, with crushed ice, straws and toothpicks. The dancer, whose name was Strawberry Lane, announced that she had found a sucker willing to buy her a drink. When the patron revealed himself as an undercover agent, the bar claimed innocence on the basis that the drinks were non-alcoholic; in reality, they consisted of nothing but orange juice. The courts denied mandamus, concluding that the "Legislature aimed not to protect the quality of the drink" but instead to ban solicitation schemes involving the purchase of drinks no matter what sort of drink was involved. (Greenblatt v. Martin (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 738.)
But not all mandamus cases involved quarrelsome officials, caffeinated horses, or suspiciously expensive orange juice. Some involved consequential questions of civil rights for California citizens.
California's history of school segregation--and the struggle to end it--can be traced through mandamus cases. In 1874, the California Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus to compel a principal to admit an African American girl to a primarily white school. The court did so based on the state statute, which then provided in substance "that schools shall be kept open for the admission of white children, and that the education of children of African descent must be provided for in separate schools." If there were no schools for African American children, the court reasoned, a writ would have to issue, as education is a basic right. But the court saw no problem with California maintaining two separate school systems. (Ward v. Flood (1874) 48 Cal. 36.) Eleven years later, however, the California Supreme Court approved a writ of mandamus in favor of an eight-year-old child of Chinese descent and required a school principal to admit her into a public school. The state statute had been amended in 1880 to provide that schools were "open for the admission of all children between six and twenty-one years of age residing in the district," without a restriction relating to race. Thus, there were no statutory grounds to exclude the child. (Tape v. Hurley (1885) 66 Cal. 473.) In response to backlash against this case, the Legislature enacted explicit laws allowing the Board of Education to set up separate schools for children of Chinese or Mongolian descent but did not address other ethnicities. In 1890, based on the lack of any parallel statute permitting the creation of separate schools for children of African descent, the California Supreme Court granted a writ of mandate requiring admission of an African American child to a primarily white public school. (Wysinger v. Crookshank (1890) 82 Cal. 588.) Legally required segregation in one form or another, however, continued in California into the 20th century. It was not until 1947 that the Legislature repealed the remaining statutory provisions authorizing racially segregated public schools.
The writ of mandamus has also played a significant role in determining who may marry whom. In 1948, the Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus allowing an interracial couple to marry, invalidating as unconstitutional California statutes that forbade such marriages. (Perez v. Lippold (1948) 32 Cal.2d 711.) California issued this writ of mandamus 19 years before the US Supreme Court reached a similar constitutional conclusion in Loving v. Virginia. Over half a century later, when then- San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom determined that the city clerk should issue marriage licenses to gay couples, California sought a writ of mandate forbidding the practice based on then-current California law limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman. The Supreme Court issued the writ, forbidding San Francisco from performing weddings for same-sex couples "unless and until" the California law is "judicially determined to be unconstitutional." (Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 1055.) Four years later, in In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757, the California Supreme Court reached that constitutional question and invalidated California's prohibition on same-sex marriage.
Back to the present: the mandamus petitions that come before the writs and receivers department of the Los Angeles Superior Court seek either "administrative mandamus" codified at CCP § 1094.5, or "traditional mandamus" (often called "ordinary mandamus") codified at CCP § 1085. Administrative mandamus generally seeks to review the decision of an administrative agency or some other entity required to provide a hearing. For reasons beyond the scope of this article, the California courts decided long ago that "mandamus" was the right procedural vehicle for a court to use to review such decisions. These proceedings effectively function as an appeal from the administrative decision.
Traditional mandamus, on the other hand, asks for an order that public officials and sometimes others comply with a clear legal duty. This is essentially the same writ that goes back in a direct line all the way to the Court of King's Bench in England. The standards for the right to traditional mandamus in modern mandamus cases sound remarkably similar to those set forth in James Bagg's Case. Centuries later and thousands of miles away, California judges continue to hear mandamus petitions from litigants who contend that government officials have acted unlawfully and who ask the courts to command those officials to follow the law. James Bagg, relying not on his insults but on the power of the law, would have no trouble recognizing the modern procedure.
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