No one likes being sued. This is especially true when it happens repeatedly, and when the same plaintiffs or lawyers are behind multiple cases. In these scenarios, companies and other habitual defendants will sometimes seek a way to strike back, whether for retribution or deterrence. Absent obvious counterclaims, pursuit of sanctions under FRCP 11, state equivalents or courts' inherent authority are the traditional tools for this purpose. But each has its limitations, and none is well suited to addressing a wide-ranging scheme involving multiple lawsuits.
In recent years, however, companies have increasingly turned to an aggressive new tool: lawsuits against plaintiffs' lawyers alleging that the latter have engaged in "sham litigation." These claims assert that the plaintiff-side firms have pursued cases that are frivolous or designed to extort funds through the sheer weight of court proceedings, regardless of merit. While plaintiffs and their counsel are ordinarily protected from liability for pursuing court relief under a longstanding First Amendment principle, courts for years have recognized certain exceptions.
One such exception, particularly available within the 9th Circuit, involves cases in which plaintiffs' counsel have used material falsehoods to distort litigation outcomes. Once obscure and very difficult to pursue, this form of "sham" theory has survived dismissal in several recent cases. Companies considering a similar strategy, however, should be aware of the challenges and pitfalls that await the hunted who seeks to become the hunter.
Noerr-Pennington and the sham litigation exception
Ordinarily, one cannot be sued for pursuing litigation against someone else. The First Amendment protects the right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances," and the Supreme Court has translated that into the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which generally precludes liability for litigation conduct.
But there is an exception: "sham litigation" is not protected. The Supreme Court has held that this applies when a lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought to injure an opponent through the burdens of the litigation process rather than to obtain a favorable outcome. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). Some courts recognize a second category involving a series of proceedings pursued without regard to their merits, using the litigation process itself as a weapon.
And in the 9th Circuit, there is a rarely used third type of sham exception, where the plaintiff "mak[es] intentional misrepresentations to the court," which "deprive the litigation of its legitimacy." Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Centers, 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998). This is meant to apply not to routine sanctionable conduct but rather to outright "fraud" on the court, committed with "predatory intent" and generally involving issues "central" to the litigation. Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 646-48 (9th Cir. 2009).
Rising claims of sham litigation based on fraudulent conduct
Fraud-based sham theories may be due for a renaissance. In a number of recent decisions, courts have allowed companies to pursue racketeering lawsuits against plaintiffs' lawyers based on allegations of sham litigation involving fraud on the court. For example, in Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Simon & Simon P.C., Uber sued a plaintiffs' firm and several related defendants in Pennsylvania federal court for allegedly using false medical records to inflate personal injury claims, often leading Uber to settle cases for excessive amounts. In May 2026, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on Noerr-Pennington grounds, finding that the alleged fabrication of medical evidence concerning the existence, cause and treatment of injuries could "infect the core" of the underlying claims and defeat immunity at the pleading stage. No. 25-5365, slip op. at 18-19 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2026).
Several months later, in Uber Technologies, Inc. v. Downtown LA Law Group, LLP--involving Uber's similar allegations against LA-based plaintiffs' firms--a California federal court also denied the firms' Noerr-Pennington motion. As the court explained, alleged falsehoods concerning the existence, severity and cause of injuries went to the heart of the claims, fundamentally changing the litigation and resulting settlements. Allegations that the fraud induced less favorable settlements sufficed to plead the third sham exception. No. 2:25-cv-06612-SPG-PD, slip op. at 49-50 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2026).
Most recently, in J-M Manufacturing Co. v. Simmons Hanly Conroy, LLP, a pipe manufacturer brought a RICO case in Illinois federal court against plaintiffs' firms that had brought hundreds of asbestos-related lawsuits against it. The company alleged that the firms had extracted settlements from it by, among other things, inducing witnesses to provide demonstrably false testimony, concealing key evidence and providing misleading discovery responses. Again, the court denied the firms' motion to dismiss, finding that the alleged knowing falsehoods about asbestos exposure went to the case's core and materially affected the proceedings, sufficiently pleading the fraudulent-misrepresentation branch of the sham exception. No. 24 C 3853, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2026).
Implications for companies and their counsel
This renewed application of "fraud on the court" exceptions to Noerr-Pennington--part of a broader trend of sham litigation cases that large companies have filed against plaintiffs' lawyers--is unlikely to abate soon. Success often breeds imitation, and companies may relish the chance to turn the tables on their pursuers. Moreover, the development of AI technology and external investment in law firms (such as through private equity firms) promise to lower the costs of pursuing litigation against companies while expanding the resources to do so--suggesting a possible surge of lawsuits by consumers, employees or shareholders. Corporate targets may see sham litigation claims as a way to fight back and stem the tide.
But there are real limitations. The sham litigation doctrine is meant to be an exception to Noerr-Pennington's rule that lawsuits about lawsuits are generally disfavored. In various other cases over the past several years, courts have tossed out cases that appeared to be plain-vanilla challenges to the merits of earlier lawsuits.
Companies considering pursuing sham litigation claims should thus keep in mind several factors when evaluating the prospects of such a case:
• Do the misrepresentations go to the heart of the case? Not all false statements to the court will support a sham litigation claim. The distinction is between fraud that undermines a claim's factual foundation and misconduct collateral to an otherwise legitimate case. For example, fabricated evidence of injury or exposure may qualify; inflated fee requests do not necessarily do so.
• Are the elements of RICO satisfied? Companies have often brought sham litigation claims under the RICO statute, which allows for both a federal forum and the possibility of treble damages and an award of attorney fees. But RICO claims are notoriously difficult to plead properly, requiring careful allegations of not only fraudulent statements but also an illegal "enterprise," a "pattern" of racketeering conduct, appropriate causation and other particular elements. Any plan to pursue such a theory must evaluate whether each RICO requirement can be satisfied.
• Can state-law claims survive? Sham litigation claims often also add causes of action under state law, such as common law fraud, unfair competition, unjust enrichment or malicious prosecution. But those claims can run into separate obstacles under state law, such as California's litigation privilege, which in some ways is stricter than Noerr-Pennington. Malicious prosecution avoids that privilege but imposes its own requirements, including favorable termination and lack of probable cause. State law claims can also be subject to anti-SLAPP motions, which carry the risk of adverse attorney fee awards.
The strongest cases will ask not courts to punish aggressive advocacy, but rather to remedy provable fraud that corrupted the litigation itself. For companies considering becoming the hunter, that distinction should guide the pursuit.
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