Daily Appellate Report: Our experts pick the year's most impactful and intriguing decisions

The Daily Journal's in-house team of attorneys review and brief hundreds of appellate decisions each year for publication in the Daily Appellate Report. This year, we asked them to select opinions they wrote about that they found most interesting or impactful -- and to explain why it stood out. Here's what they had to say.

Lake v. Gates (In re: Dershowitz) - 9th Cir. (23-16023)

In this suit, Kari Lake and Mark Finchem alleged that Arizona's electronic voting system insufficiently protected the rights of voters and called for those systems to be replaced by hand-counted paper ballots. Attorney Alan Dershowitz signed the amended complaint as "Of Counsel for Plaintiffs Kari Lake and Mark Finchem." The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing and awarded sanctions against plaintiffs' counsel. Dershowitz appealed, arguing that "of counsel" attorneys cannot be sanctioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

The 9th Circuit disagreed, finding that "of counsel" attorneys are no less susceptible to FRCP 11 sanctions than other attorneys. Under FRCP 11(b), attorneys certify through their signings, submissions and advocacy that: the pleadings or motions they submit are not presented for any improper purpose; the claims, defenses and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by nonfrivolous arguments for changing existing law; and the factual contentions have, or likely will have, evidentiary support. To hold "of counsel" attorneys to a less stringent standard would defy the rule's plain meaning and undermine its purpose--i.e., to deter baseless filings or, in this case, to prevent well-known attorneys from lending the ostensible credibility of their name to lawsuits by signing onto the complaint. Because this was a matter of first impression, the court reversed the imposition of sanctions in this instance. However, this ruling serves as a reminder that of counsel attorneys must be as scrupulous as lead counsel about the merits and legitimacy of their submissions to courts.

-- Christie Bahna

K.C. v. County of Merced - Cal. App. (F087088)

In K.C. v. County of Merced, the Fifth Appellate District concluded that statutes granting discretionary immunity to public employees and derivative immunity to public entity employers shielded the County of Merced from liability for an employee's failure to investigate reported child sexual assault while in foster care. According to the court, decisions relating to investigation of child abuse and discontinuation of a foster placement based on suspicion of abuse involved not only the exercise of analysis and judgment on the part of employees but also sensitive policy decisions requiring judicial abstention to avoid affecting a coordinate governmental entity's decision-making process.

With Los Angeles County agreeing to pay approximately $4.8 billion to settle thousands of claims of sexual assault under a state statute reviving previously time-barred claims, this decision provides school districts and foster-care facilities with at least one clear defense for claims where the employee was not accused of assault but of failing to take action to address it. In the face of massive financial exposure, this defense may prove invaluable for public employers and entities given the numerous cases still pending under the revival statute.

-- Josh Ogle

Agnone v. Agnone - Cal. App. (B321252)

In Agnone v. Agnone, the California Supreme Court upheld nearly $10,000 in sanctions against sports bettor Kenneth Madick and his attorney for obstructive behavior during a deposition in a contentious divorce case. Despite appearing by video, Madick's attorney refused to activate his webcam, even as opposing counsel protested that the setup concealed potential witness coaching. The California Supreme Court found that the trial judge acted within the scope of the Civil Discovery Act--specifically under Sections 2023.010 and 2023.030--which authorize sanctions for "unusual forms of discovery abuse." In this case, that abuse took the shape of digital gamesmanship, frustrating the opposing party's ability to conduct a fair examination.

By affirming the sanctions, the California Supreme Court sent a pointed message: The rules of discovery apply as fully in virtual proceedings as in physical courtrooms. Hiding behind a blank screen, whether literally or figuratively, will not shield misconduct. Though technology may change the setting of litigation, the duty of transparency underpinning it remains constant.

-- Antoneth Dizon Fong

People v. McGhee - Cal. (S169750)

In the high-profile murder trial of gang leader Timothy McGhee, the California Supreme Court overturned the removal of a juror, finding that the trial court's decision lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Juror 5 had been dismissed mid-deliberation after fellow jurors complained that he was biased against the prosecution and unwilling to deliberate. On review, the California Supreme Court concluded that the record showed otherwise: Juror 5 had participated in discussions, voiced skepticism grounded in the evidence, and merely held views unpopular with the majority. Such disagreement, the California Supreme Court emphasized, does not equate to misconduct or refusal to deliberate.

People v. McGhee's ruling serves as a forceful reaffirmation of juror independence and the sanctity of deliberation, cautioning trial courts against removing dissenting jurors simply because their reasoning is unorthodox or their tone abrasive. In protecting the lone holdout's right to think differently, the California Supreme Court reinforced a central principle of the justice system--that verdicts must reflect honest deliberation, not conformity or convenience.

-- Antoneth Dizon Fong

Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. - Cal. App. (B331918)

In this case, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment in the defendant's favor. However, nearly all of the quotations in plaintiff's counsel's opening appellate brief, and many of the quotations in the reply brief, were fabricated--either because they were the product of artificial intelligence (AI) "hallucinations" (i.e., nonexistent cases), or because the cases existed but did not support the propositions for which they were cited. In total, the opening brief contained 23 case quotations, 21 of which were fabrications. The reply brief contained many more fabricated quotations. While many federal courts and other sources have addressed the use of AI to generate fake legal authority, the Court of Appeal published this opinion because no California court had previously addressed this issue.

After finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the court issued a "warning": No pleading, brief, motion or filing should contain any citations--whether provided by generative AI or not--that the submitting attorney has not personally read and verified. Even assuming the truth of counsel's assurances that he neither intended to deceive the court nor knew that AI could "hallucinate," the Court of Appeal found that his conduct violated the California Rules of Court and his basic duty to his client. It therefore imposed monetary sanctions and ordered that the opinion be served on his client and the State Bar. It declined to order sanctions payable to opposing counsel.

While the question of AI's role in the legal profession is not brand new, 2025 seemed to be the year courts were truly forced to grapple with the issue--particularly AI "hallucinations" and what response or sanction, if any, is appropriate when attorneys misuse AI. To be sure, AI is not going anywhere; but neither should common sense or the fundamental principles of ethics. Attorneys will always be held responsible for the content of their submissions to courts and should, at a bare minimum, read and/or verify the cases generated by their AI "associates."

-- Christie Bahna

Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit District - Cal. App. (F088135)

In Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit District, the Court of Appeal held that comparative negligence need not be submitted to a jury where the evidence shows that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of an injury. Video evidence plainly showed that the plaintiff stood on a moving bus without bracing herself or holding onto anything before falling and suffering her injuries. Since comparative negligence presupposes negligence on both sides, such principles simply do not come into play where there is no fault to allocate. In a similar vein, in Murphy v. Pina, the Court of Appeal concluded that hearsay testimony from a previous deposition could not be used to raise a triable issue of material fact at the summary judgment stage. Since the evidence was inadmissible hearsay, it could not have been introduced at trial, so it could not be relied upon at the summary judgment stage to raise a triable issue of fact.

Taken together, these cases serve as a clear reminder that, when faced with a motion for summary judgment, the obstacle is to raise a triable issue of material fact. Moreover, this obstacle can only be overcome via admissible evidence. Accordingly, where clear, unbiased, admissible evidence shows that there are no material questions on fault to be posed to a factfinder, the action will not survive summary judgment. Similarly, in the face of a lack of admissible evidence, no triable issues of fact will be raised, and the action will conclude before being presented to a factfinder.

-- Josh Ogle